October 2, 2002

Setting the American Precedent

For years, tensions have existed between the large nation and the small nation. The large nation does not recognize the smaller one's sovereignty, which for the small nation is a subject of bitter complaint. Finally, citing intelligence that the smaller nation has acquired weapons that pose a clear and present threat to the larger nation's security, the larger nation launches a pre-emptive strike.

The United States and Iraq? No, mainland China and Taiwan, in a scenario that comes straight from the worst fears of foreign-policy observers and experts.

Those who have recently voiced such concerns in the nation's opinion pages and on Sunday talk shows are worried about a new aspect of American foreign-policy doctrine, which claims that the United States has the right to make a pre-emptive military strike against any nation perceived as a threat. Specifically, the concerns are about how other nations might use the American precedent to justify their own military incursions around the world.

Would India, for example, use the pre-emptive doctrine to justify an invasion of Pakistan? Or Israel in a strike against any one of its demonstrably hostile neighbors? We've already seen how the war on terrorism has emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin's onslaught against the breakaway republic of Chechnya, in much the same way that despots in various corners of the world have labeled their opposition "terrorists" since Sept. 11. Now, in a seeming linkage to U.S. efforts to secure Russian approval for action against Iraq in the United Nations Security Council, Putin has warned that he's prepared to attack Chechen rebels hiding in the Pankisi Gorge of neighboring Georgia.

Of all the potential repercussions from the new doctrine of pre-emption, though, none raises quite so much concern as the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The United States has a clear interest here, as U.S. policy stops just short of explicitly guaranteeing Taiwan's defense but hints at it nonetheless (last year President Bush said that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan against mainland attack, before backpedaling in the face of Chinese protest).

The diplomatic triangle among the Untied States, Taiwan and China is at an especially delicate pass right now. While "One China" remains official U.S. policy, the Bush administration has recently made a number of respectful gestures toward Taiwan -- flying the U.S. flag at the main American office in Taiwan (because of One China, it's not called an embassy) and allowing the Taiwanese president's wife to visit Washington. As small and symbolic as these gestures are, they have antagonized officials on the mainland at a time when some in Taiwan are pressing for a referendum on independence.

Of potentially greater consequence, though, is a pending U.S. State Department ruling on whether to allow Taiwan to receive sophisticated air-to-air missiles it purchased in 2000. The missiles were not to be delivered unless China developed or acquired a similar system. Now, amid reports that China has done so, the United States faces a decision that could momentarily tip the balance of power between China and Taiwan and spark strong negative reaction from China.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin is scheduled to visit President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch later this month. Some experts say that concerns about setting precedents are overstated -- that Jiang and other world leaders will act in their own perceived national interest regardless of perceived constraints. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to hear what the Chinese president has to say about Taiwan and Iraq, and whether, in talking to President Bush, he will mention the two in the same breath. print_file('footer'); ?>