Dan Rather and Richard Nixon would spar with each other during presidential press conferences. Nixon did not hold many White House press conferences, and particularly did not like televised news conferences. But when they were held, Nixon would demonstrate his disregard for reporters and Dan Rather in particular. The White House press conference held on October 26, 1973 is regarded by many journalists such as Helen Thomas to be "the lowest point ever between the president and the press."
Every conversation between Dan Rather and Richard Nixon at the White House is here in chronological order, but the October 26, 1973 press conference is last because of its length. That conference includes Nixon exclaiming, "I have never heard or seen such outrageous, vicious, distorted reporting in 27 years of public life." The excerpt includes questions from reporters other than Rather, and includes the discussion of topics such as Middle East peace and Soviet policy, as well as Nixon's opinion of the press.
President Nixon held press conferences elsewhere, and those are not included. The famous "Are you running for something?" spat between the two occurred in Houston.
The most heated and interesting word-play in the Nixon-Rather dialogues is highlighted in bold in order to make it easier to find.
RATHER: Mr. President, as a lawyer, and as his immediate superior, do you approve of the following actions of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover: One, accusations which were made public accusing two men of conspiring to kidnap a Government official and/or blow up Government buildings as an anti-war action before any formal charges have been made and a trial could be arranged for those gentlemen, and continuing to call the late Martin Luther King a liar?
Do you approve of those actions?
NIXON: I have often been asked about my opinion of Mr. Hoover. I believe that he has rendered very great service to this country. I generally approve of the actions that he has taken. I am not going to go into any of the specific actions that you may be asking about tonight with regard to the testimony, for example, that you referred to.
—December 10, 1970
NIXON: Mr. Horner
HORNER: Mr. President, what does a refusal of all but a handful of the sick and disabled prisoners that South Vietnam had planned to return to the North do to the chances for exchange of such prisoners?
NIXON: Mr. Horner, you will remember that we went through somewhat the same thing in Korea many years ago when the Korean prisoners, many of them, refused to go back. As far as this is concerned, there are a few, less than 20, who have agreed to go back, and, of course, they will be returned.
We hope that the refusal of the others to go back will not deter the North Vietnamese at least to consider some kind of action on their part with regard to sick and disabled prisoners.
NIXON. Mr. Rather.
RATHER: Mr. President, thank you. And I especially appreciate it because it gives me an opportunity to follow up on Mr. Horner's question. Some of the wives — by no means all — but some of the wives of prisoners of war held by North Vietnamese are critical of you and your policies concerning their husbands, saying specifically, among other things, that you should set a date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops in Vietnam contingent upon release of all the prisoners; that, if North Vietnam doesn't respond, then you lose nothing by that.
The question is, first, generally, would you respond to that criticism, and then specifically, what is there to lose by setting a date contingent upon release of all prisoners?
NIXON: Mr. Rather, I discussed this matter with Ambassador Bruce when he was here. And I asked him what success he had had in raising this question with the North Vietnamese, because, as you note, they have even put out stories to the effect that if we would set a date certain, way in the future, they would be willing to move on the prisoner issue. It always comes back to the same thing. If we end our involvement in Vietnam and set a date, they will agree to discuss prisoners, not release them.
Now, we have been around this track before. I should point out that when President Johnson agreed to the bombing halt in October of 1968, he did so with the understanding that there was going to be progress in the negotiations, that there was going to be discussions, and for two and a half years we have had discussions in Paris and no progress.
Now, as far as we are concerned, we at this time are not going to make any kind of agreement with regard to prisoners that is not going to be followed by action or concurrent with action; from the standpoint of the North Vietnamese, we have yet no indication whatever that they would be willing to release prisoners in the event that we took certain steps.
—June 1, 1971
REPORTER: Mr. President, why are you not, sir, holding news conferences with very much regularity or frequency? And what, in particular, do you have against televised news conferences? I believe it has been more than 8 months since you have held one of those.
NIXON: Well, I will hold news conferences whenever I believe that they will serve the public interest.
As far as televised news conferences are concerned, I find that the ladies and gentlemen in the press corps have a very vigorous difference of opinion as to which is the more valuable forum.
I remember the last time, or a few months ago, that I was in this office, the first time I had an in-office conference. Mr. Bailey, the former head of the White House Correspondents, said, "This is the best kind of press conference." I am sure Mr. Rather thinks the best kind of press conference is one with him alone. (Laughter)
—February 10, 1972
RATHER: Mr. President--
NIXON: Mr. Rather. I remember your name. (Laughter)
RATHER: I remember yours, too. (Laughter)
The background of this question is your own statements made down in Texas, among other places, saying that you had not sanctioned and would no sanction the bombing of the dikes and dams in North Vietnam, because you considered it an inhumane act because of what it would do to civilians.
Within the past week there have been reports of eyewitnesses — one of these reports came from the French Press Agency, and another, I think, was the Swedish Ambassador in Hanoi — eyewitnesses claiming to have seen American planes hit dikes and dams.
The question is, has such bombing occurred? If so, what steps are you taking to see that it doesn't happen again?
NIXON: Mr. Rather, we have checked those reports. They have proved to be inaccurate. The bombing of dikes is something, as you will recall from the gentleman who asked the question in Texas, was something that some people have advocated. The United States has used great restraint in its bombing policy and, I think, properly so. We have tried to hit only military targets and we have been hitting military targets. We have had orders out not to hit dikes because the result in terms of civilian casualties would be extraordinary.
As far as any future activities are concerned, those orders still are in force. I do not intend to allow any orders to go out which would involve civilian casualties if they can be avoided. Military targets only will be allowed.
—June 29, 1972
RATHER: Mr. President, I want to state this question with due respect to your office, but also as directly as possible.
NIXON: That would be unusual. (Laughter)
RATHER: I would like to think not, sir. It concerns—-
NIXON: You are always respectful, Mr. Rather. You know that.
RATHER: Thank you, Mr. President. It concerns the events surrounding Mr. Ehrlichman's contact and, on one occasion, your own contact with the judge in the Pentagon Papers case, Judge Byrne.
NIXON: Yes
RATHER: As I understand your own explanation of events, and putting together your statement with Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony and what Judge Byrne has said, what happened here is that sometime late in March — March 17, I believe you said — you first found out about the break-in at the psychiatrist's office of Mr. Ellsberg, that you asked to have that looked into and that you later, I think in late April, instructed Attorney General Kleindienst to inform the judge.
Now, my question is this: that, while the Pentagon Papers trial was going on, Mr. Ehrlichman secretly met once with the judge in that case, you secretly met another time the judge with Mr. Ehrlichman. Now, you are a lawyer, and given the state of the situation and what you knew, could you give us some reason why the American people should not believe that that was at least a subtle attempt to bribe the judge in that case, and it gave at least the appearance of a lack of moral leadership?
NIXON: Well, I would say the only part of your statement that is perhaps accurate is that I am a lawyer. Now, beyond that, Mr. Rather, let me say that with regard to the "secret" meeting that we had with the judge, as he said, I met the judge briefly — after all, I had appointed him to the position — I met him for perhaps one minute outside my door here in full view of the whole White House staff and everybody else who wanted to see. I asked him how he liked his job — we did not discuss the case — and he went on for his meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman.
Now, why did the meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman take place? Because we had determined that Mr. Gray could not be confirmed, as you will recall. We were on a search for a Director of the FBI. Mr. Kleindienst had been here, and I asked him what he would recommend with regard to a Director, and I laid down certain qualifications.
I said I wanted a man preferably with FBI experience, and preferably with prosecutor's experience, and preferably, if possible, a Democrat so that we would have no problem on confirmation. He said, "The man for the job is Byrne." He said, "He is the best man." I said, "Would you recommend him?" He said, "Yes."
Under those circumstances then, Mr. Ehrlichman called Mr. Byrne. He said: Under no circumstances will we talk to you — he, Ehrlichman, will talk to you — if he felt that it would in any way compromise his handling of the Ellsberg case.
Judge Byrne made the decision that he would talk to Mr. Ehrlichman, and he did talk to him privately, here. And on that occasion, he talked to him privately, the case was not discussed at all — only the question of whether or not, at the conclusion of this case, Mr. Byrne would like to be considered as Director of the FBI.
I understand, incidentally, that he told Mr. Ehrlichman that he would be interested. Of course, the way the things broke eventually, we found another name with somewhat the same qualifications, although, in this case, not a judge — in this case, a chief of police with former FBI experience.
Now, with regard to the Ellsberg break-in, let me explain that in terms of that, I discussed that on the telephone with Mr. Henry Petersen on the 18th of April. It was on the 18th of April that I learned that the grand jury was going away from some of its Watergate investigation and moving into national security areas.
I told Mr. Petersen at that time about my concern about the security areas, and particularly about the break-in as far as the Ellsberg case is concerned.
And then he asked me a very critical question which you, as a non-lawyer, will now understand, and lawyers probably will, too. He said, "Was any evidence developed out of this break-in?" And I said, "No, it was a dry hole." He said, "Good."
Now, what he meant by that was that in view of the fact that no evidence was developed as a result of the break-in — which is, incidentally, illegal, unauthorized, as far as I was concerned, and completely deplorable — but since no evidence was developed, there was no requirement that it be presented to the jury that was hearing the case. That was why Mr. Petersen, a man of impeccable credentials in the law enforcement field, did not, at that time on the 18th, at a time that I told him what I had known about the Ellsberg break-in, say, "Let's present it then to the grand jury," because nothing had been accomplished, nothing had been obtained that would taint the case.
It was approximately 10 days later that Mr. Kleindienst came in and said that, after a review of the situation in the prosecutor's office in Washington, in which Mr. Petersen had also participated, that they believed that it was best that we bend over backwards in this case and send this record of the Ellsberg break-in, even though there was no evidence obtained from it that could have affected the jury one way or another, send it to the judge.
When they made that recommendation to me, I directed that it be done, instantly. It was done. Incidentally, the prosecutor argued this case just the way that I have argued it to you, and whether or not it had an effect on the eventual outcome, I do not know.
At least, as far as we know, Mr. Ellsberg went free, this being one of the factors. But that is the explanation of what happened and obviously, you, in your commentary tonight, can attach anything you want to it.
I hope you will be just as fair and objective as I try to be in giving you the answer. And I know you will be, sir.
—August 22, 1973
NIXON: Mr. Jarriel.
JARRIEL: Mr. President, in association with the legal dispute going on over possession of the Presidential tapes relating to Watergate conversations in your office, you and your attorneys have said you would abide only by a definitive ruling of the Supreme Court in this case. As it moves along, the definitive ruling -- and interpretation of "definitive ruling" takes on great importance. Would you elaborate for us what you mean by a "definitive ruling?"
NIXON: No, Mr. Jarriel, that would not be appropriate. I discussed this with White House Counsel, and as you know, the matter is now on appeal, and the appellate procedure will now go to the Circuit Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia and, if necessary, further on. The matter of definitive ruling is one that will be discussed in the appeal procedure, and for me, in advance of the decision, the briefs, the oral arguments, to discuss that would be inappropriate.
I think we should come to Mr. Rather now.
RATHER: Mr. President, if I may follow on to my colleague Tom Jarriel's question, while I can understand—-
NIXON: It shows the two networks working together.
RATHER: No, not always, Mr. President.
NIXON: Thank heaven you are competitors.
RATHER: This is a question that we find a lot of people ask us.
NIXON: Surely.
RATHER: As you know, President Lincoln said, "No man is above the law." Now, for most, if not every other American, any Supreme Court decision is final, whether the person, in terms of the decision, finds it definitive or not. Would you explain to us why you feel that you are in a different category, why, as it applies to you, that you will abide only by what you call a definitive decision and that you won't even define "definitive?"
NIXON: Well, Mr. Rather, with all due deference to your
comment with regard to President Lincoln, he was a very strong President, and as you may recall, he indicated several times during his Presidency that he would move in the national interest in a way that many thought was perhaps in violation of the law — the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, for example, during the Civil War for 15,000 people, and other items, to mention only one.
As far as I am concerned, I am simply saying that the President of the United States, under our Constitution, has a responsibility to this office to maintain the separation of power and also maintain the ability of not only this President but future Presidents to conduct the office in the interests of the people.
Now, in order to do that, it is essential that the confidentiality of discussions that the President has — with his advisors, with Members of Congress, with visitors from abroad, with others who come in — that those discussions be uninhibited, that they be candid, they be freewheeling.
Now, in the event that Presidential papers, or in the event that Presidential conversations as recorded on tapes, in my opinion, were made available to a court, to a judge in camera or to a committee of Congress, that principle would be so seriously jeopardized that it would probably destroy that principle — the confidentiality which is so essential and indispensable for the proper conduct of the Presidency.
That is why I have taken the hard line that I have taken with regard to complying with the lower court's order.
Now, when we come to the Supreme Court, the question there is what kind of an order is the Supreme Court going to issue, if any. And as I have said in answer to Mr. Jarriel, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on whether an order would be definitive or not. I will simply say that as far as I am concerned, we are going to fight the tape issue. We believe, my Counsel believe, that we will prevail in the appellate courts.
And so, consequently, I will not respond to your question until we go through the appellate procedure.
—September 5, 1973
RATHER: Mr. President, may I follow on to my colleague's question and also to Miss Thomas's question. Within the past week or 10 days, the House Judiciary Committee and the Justice Department have issued differing interpretations of what, by constitutional definition, is an impeachable offense for a President.
Now, as we all know, you are an experienced student of the Constitution, and I think people would be interested to know what you consider to be an impeachable offense for a President, particularly on the dividing line, whether it requires that the House determine that they believe that the President may have committed a crime or whether dereliction of duty, not upholding the Constitution, is enough in itself to constitute an impeachable offense?
NIXON: Well, Mr. Rather, you don't have to be a constitutional lawyer to know that the Constitution is very precise in defining what is an impeachable offense. And in this respect it is the opinion of White House Counsel and a number of other constitutional lawyers, who are perhaps more up-to-date on this than I am at this time, that a criminal offense on the part of the President is the requirement for impeachment.
This is a matter which will be presented, however, to the committee by Mr. St. Clair in a brief which he presently is preparing.
—February 25, 1974
October 26, 1973:
The President: Mr. Rather.
Q: Mr. President, I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts, tell us what goes through your mind when you hear people, people who love this country and people who believe in you, say reluctantly that perhaps you should resign or be impeached.
NIXON: Well, I am glad we don't take the vote of this room, let me say. And I understand the feelings of people with regard to impeachment and resignation. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rather, you may remember that when I made the rather difficult decision -- I thought the most difficult decision of my first term -- on December 18, the bombing by B-52's of North Vietnam, that exactly the same words were used on the networks -- I don't mean by you, but they were quoted on the networks -- that were used now: tyrant, dictator, he has lost his senses, he should resign, he should be impeached.
But I stuck it out, and as a result of that, we not only got our prisoners of war home, as I have often said, on their feet rather than on their knees, but we brought peace to Vietnam, something we haven't had and didn't for over 12 years.
It was a hard decision, and it was one that many of my friends in the press who had consistently supported me on the war up to that time disagreed with. Now, in this instance I realize there are people who feel that the actions that I have taken with regard to the dismissal of Mr. Cox are grounds for impeachment.
I would respectfully suggest that even Mr. Cox and Mr. Richardson have agreed that the President had the right, constitutional right, to dismiss anybody in the Federal Government. And second, I should also point out that as far as the tapes are concerned, rather than being in defiance of the law, I am in compliance with the law.
As far as what goes through my mind, I would simply say that I intend to carry out, to the best of my ability, the responsibilities I was elected to carry out last November. The events of this past week -- I know, for example, in your head office in New York (CBS Headquarters), some thought that it was simply a blown-up exercise; there wasn't a real crisis. I wish it had been that. It was a real crisis. It was the most difficult crisis we have had since the Cuban confrontation of 1962.
But because we had had our initiative with the Soviet Union, because I had a basis of communication with Mr. Brezhnev, we not only avoided a confrontation but we moved a great step forward toward real peace in the Mideast.
Now, as long as I can carry out that kind of responsibility, I am going to continue to do this job.
Motives of Mr. Cox
NIXON: Mr. Lisagor.
Q: There have been reports that you felt that Mr. Cox was somehow out to get you. I would like to ask you if you did feel that, and if so, what evidence did you have?
NIXON: Mr. Lisagor, I understand Mr. Cox is going to testify next week under oath before the Judiciary Committee, and I would suggest that he perhaps would be better qualified to answer that question.
As far as I am concerned, we had cooperated with the Special Prosecutor. We tried to work out in a cooperative way this matter of the production of the tapes. He seemed to be more interested in the issue than he was in a settlement, and under the circumstances, I had no choice but to dismiss him. But I am not going to question his motives as to whether or not he was out to get me. Perhaps the Senators would like to ask that question.
The Nation's Confidence
Q: Mr. President, in 1968, before you were elected, you wrote that too many shocks can drain a nation of its energy and even cause a rebellion against creative change and progress. Do you think America is at that point now?
NIXON: I think that many would speculate -- I have noted a lot on the networks, particularly, and sometimes even in the newspapers. But this is a very strong country, and the American people, I think, can ride through the shocks that they have -- the difference now from what it was in the days of shocks, even when Mr. Lisagor and I first met 25 years ago, is the electronic media.
I have never heard or seen such outrageous, vicious, distorted reporting in 27 years of public life. I am not blaming anybody for that. Perhaps what happened is that what we did brought it about, and therefore, the media decided that they would have to take that particular line.
But when people are pounded night after night with that kind of frantic, hysterical reporting, it naturally shakes their confidence. And yet, I should point out that even in this week, when many thought that the President was shell-shocked, unable to act, the President acted decisively in the interests of peace, in the interests of the country, and I can assure you that whatever shocks gentlemen of the press may have, or others, political people, these shocks will not affect me in my doing my job.
The Middle East Crisis
Q: Mr. President, getting back to the Middle East crisis for a moment, do you consider that the crisis is over now, and how much longer will the American forces be kept on alert around the world?
NIXON: With regard to the alert, the alert has already been discontinued with regard to NORAD, that is, the North American (Air Defense) Command, and with regard to SAC (Strategic Air Command). As far as other forces are concerned, they are being maintained in a state of readiness, and obviously, Soviet Union forces are being maintained in a state of readiness.
Now, as far as the crisis in the Mideast is concerned, I don't want to leave any impression that we aren't going to continue to have problems with regard to the cease-fire. There will be outbreaks because of the proximity of the antagonistic forces, and there will be some very, very tough negotiating in attempting to reach a diplomatic settlement. But I think now that all parties are going to approach this problem of trying to reach a settlement with a more sober and a more determined attitude than ever before, because the Mideast can't afford -- Israel can't afford, Egypt can't afford, Syria can't afford -- another war. The world cannot afford a war in that part of the world. And because the Soviet Union and the United States have potentially conflicting interests there, we both now realize that we cannot allow our differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even greater interests that we have, for example, in continuing a détente in Europe, in continuing the negotiations which can lead to a limitation of nuclear arms and eventually reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and in continuing in other ways that can contribute to the peace of the world.
As a matter of fact, I would suggest that with all of the criticism of détente, that without détente, we might have had a major conflict in the Middle East. With détente, we avoided it.
Oil and the Middle East
Q: Mr. President, a question from the electronic media, related to the Middle East--
NIXON: (to Forrest J. Boyd, Mutual Broadcasting System). Radio.
Q: Radio, yes. I have heard that there was a meeting at the State Department this afternoon of major oil company executives on the fuel shortage. Whether or not you can confirm that, has this confrontation in the Middle East caused a still more severe oil problem, and is there any thinking now of gasoline rationing?
NIXON: Well, we have contingency plans for gasoline rationing and so forth, which I hope never have to be put into place.
But with regard to the oil shortage, which you referred to, one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency to our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of an oil cutoff.
Let me say that I have also noted that in the State Department -- or from the State Department -- today a statement raised a little difficulty in Europe to the effect that our European friends hadn't been as cooperative as they might have been in attempting to help us work out the Middle East settlement or at least the settlement to the extent that we have worked it out as of the resolution of yesterday.
I can only say on that score that Europe, which gets 80 percent of its oil from the Mideast, would have frozen to death this winter unless there had been a settlement, and Japan, of course, is in that same position. The United States, of course, gets only approximately 10 percent of its oil from the Mideast.
What I am simply suggesting is this: that with regard to the fuel shortage, potentially, in the United States and in the world, it is indispensable at this time that we avoid any further Mideast crisis so that the flow of oil to Europe, to Japan, and to the United States can continue.
Exchanges with General Secretary Brezhnev
Q: Mr. President, against this background of détente, Mr. Brezhnev's note to you has been described as rough or perhaps brutal by one Senator. Can you characterize it for us and for history in any way?
NIXON: Yes, I could characterize it, but, Mr. Theis (J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers and Hearst Headline Service), it wouldn't be in the national interest to do so. My notes to him he might characterize as being rather rough. However, I would rather -- perhaps it would be best to characterize it. Rather than saying, Mr. Theis, that his note to me was rough and brutal, I would say that it was very firm, and it left very little to the imagination as to what he intended.
And my response was also very firm and left little to the imagination of how we would react. And it is because he and I know each other, and it is because we have had this personal contact, that notes exchanged in that way result in a settlement rather than a confrontation.
Mr. Rebozo and Campaign Contributions
NIXON: Mr. Deakin?
Q: Yes, Mr. Deakin. Is it credible, can the American people believe that your close friend, Mr. Rebozo, for 3 years, during which time you saw him weekly sometimes, kept from you the fact that he had $l00,000 in cash from Mr. Howard Hughes? Is that credible? Is it credible that your personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach, knew about this money for at least a year and never told you about it?
And if this was a campaign contribution, as your press secretaries say, who authorized Mr. Rebozo to collect campaign contributions for your reelection or for the Republican Party?
What campaign committee was he an official of?
NIXON: Well, it is obviously not credible to you, and I suppose that it would sound incredible to many people who do not know how I operate. In terms of campaign contributions, I have had a rule, Mr. Deakin, which Mr. Stans, Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Rebozo, and every contributor will agree has been the rule -- I have refused always to accept contributions myself. I have refused to have any discussion of contributions. As a matter of fact, my orders to Mr. Stans were that after the campaign was over, I would then send notes of appreciation to those that contributed, but before the election, I did not want to have any information from anybody with regard to campaign contributions.
Now, with regard to Mr. Rebozo, let me say that he showed, I think, very good judgment in doing what he did. He received a contribution. He was prepared to turn it over to the finance chairman when the finance chairman was appointed. But in that interlude, after he received the contribution and before the finance chairman was appointed, the Hughes company, as you all know, had an internal fight of massive proportions, and he felt that such a contribution to the campaign might prove to be embarrassing.
At the conclusion of the campaign, he decided that it would be in the best interests of everybody concerned rather than to turn the money over then, to be used in the '74 campaigns, to return it intact. And I would say that any individual, and particularly a banker, who would have a contribution of $100,000 and not touch it -- because it was turned back in exactly the form it was received -- I think that is a pretty good indication that he is a totally honest man, which he is.
Presidential Tape Recordings
Q: Mr. President, after the tapes are presented to Judge Sirica and they are processed under the procedure outlined by the U.S. Court of Appeals, will you make those tapes public?
NIXON: No, that is not the procedure that the court has ordered, and it would not be proper. Judge Sirica, under the circuit court's order, is to listen to the tapes and, then, is to present to the grand jury the pertinent evidence with regard to its investigation. Publication of the tapes has not been ordered by the circuit court of appeals, and Judge Sirica, of course, would not do anything that would be in contravention of what the circuit court of appeals has ordered.
Presidential Stress
NIXON: Mr. Terhorst.
Q: Mr. President, Harry Truman used to talk about the heat in the kitchen--
NIXON: I know what he meant.
Q: --and a lot of people have been wondering how you are bearing up emotionally under the stress of recent events. Can you discuss that?
NIXON: Well, those who saw me during the Middle East crisis thought I bore up rather well, and, Mr. Terhorst, I have a quality which is -- I guess I must have inherited it from my Midwestern mother and father -- which is that the tougher it gets, the cooler I get. Of course, it isn't pleasant to get criticism. Some of it is justified, of course. It isn't pleasant to find your honesty questioned. It isn't pleasant to find, for example, that, speaking of my friend Mr. Rebozo, that despite the fact that those who printed it, and those who said it, knew it was untrue -- said that he had a million-dollar trust fund for me that he was handling -- it was nevertheless put on one of the networks, knowing it was untrue. It isn't pleasant, for example, to hear or read that a million dollars in campaign funds went into my San Clemente property and, even after we had a complete audit, to have it repeated.
Those are things which, of course, do tend to get under the skin of the man who holds this office. But as far as I am concerned, I have learned to expect it. It has been my lot throughout my political life, and I suppose because I have been through so much, that may be one of the reasons that when I have to face an international crisis, I have what it takes.
Watergate Influence on Middle East Crisis
Q: Mr. President, I would like to ask you a question about the Mideast.
To what extent do you think your Watergate troubles influenced Soviet thinking about your ability to respond in the Mideast, and did your Watergate problems convince you that the United States needed a strong response in the Mideast to convince other nations that you have not been weakened?
NIXON: Well, I have noted speculation to the effect that the Watergate problems may have led the Soviet Union to miscalculate. I tend to disagree with that, however.
I think Mr. Brezhnev probably can't quite understand how the President of the United States wouldn't be able to handle the Watergate problems. He would be able to handle it all right, if he had them. (Laughter) But I think what happens is that what Mr. Brezhnev does understand is the power of the United States. What he does know is the President of the United States.
What he also knows is that the President of the United States, when he was under unmerciful assault at the time of Cambodia at the time of May 8, when I ordered the bombing and the mining of North Vietnam, at the time of December 18, still went ahead and did what he thought was right; the fact that Mr. Brezhnev knew that regardless of the pressures at home, regardless of what people see and hear on television night after night, he would do what was right. That is what made Mr. Brezhnev act as he did.
Presidential Views on Television Coverage
Q: Mr. President, you have lambasted the television networks pretty well. Could I ask you, at the risk of reopening an obvious wound, you say after you have put on a lot of heat that you don't blame anyone. I find that a little puzzling. What is it about the television coverage of you in these past weeks and months that has so aroused your anger?
NIXON: (to Robert C. Pierpoint, CBS News). Don't get the impression that you arouse my anger. (Laughter)
Q: I'm afraid, sir, that I have that impression. (Laughter)
NIXON: You see, one can only be angry with those he respects.
Regaining the Confidence of the People
Q: Mr. President, businessmen increasingly are saying that many chief executive officers of corporations do not get the latitude you have had, if they have the personnel problems that you have had, to stay in the job and correct them. You have said you are going to stay. Do you have any plan set out to regain confidence of people across the country and these businessmen who are beginning to talk about this matter? Do you have any plans besides the Special Prosecutor, which looks backward; do you have any plan that looks forward for regaining confidence of people?
NIXON: I certainly have. First, to move forward in building a structure of peace in the world, in which we have made enormous progress in the past and which we are going to make more progress in, in the future; our European initiative, our continued initiative with the Soviet Union, with the People's Republic of China. That will be the major legacy of this Administration.
Moving forward at home in our continuing battle against the high cost of living, in which we are now finally beginning to make some progress, and moving forward also on the matters that you referred to, it is true that what happened in Watergate, the campaign abuses, were deplorable. They have been very damaging to this Administration; they have been damaging certainly to the country as well.
Let me say, too, I didn't want to leave an impression with my good friend from CBS over here that I don't respect the reporters. What I was simply saying was this: that when a commentator takes a bit of news and then, with knowledge of what the facts are, distorts it, viciously, I have no respect for that individual.
Executive Privilege
Q: Mr. President!
NIXON: (to Clark R. Mollenhoff, Des Moines Register and Tribune). You are so loud, I will have to take you.
Q: I have to be, because you happen to dodge my questions all of the time.
NIXON: You had three last time.
Q: Last May, you went before the American people, and you said executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussing of possible criminal conduct, including the Watergate affair and the alleged cover-up.
If you have revised or modified this position, as you seem to have done, could you explain the rationale of a law-and-order Administration covering up evidence, prima facie evidence, of high crimes and misdemeanors?
NIXON: Well, I should point out that perhaps all the other reporters in the room are aware of the fact that we have waived executive privilege on all individuals within the Administration. It has been the greatest waiver of executive privilege in the whole history of this Nation.
And as far as any other matters are concerned, the matters of the tapes, the matters of Presidential conversations, those are matters in which the President has a responsibility to defend this office, which I shall continue to do.
Mr. Cormier: Thank you, Mr. President. print_file('footer'); ?>